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Abstract
We study active labor market policies (ALMP) in a matching model. ALMPs
are modelled as a subsidy to job search. Workers di¤er in their productivity,
and search takes place along an extensive margin. An additional job seeker
a¤ects the quality of unemployed workers. As a result, the Hosios conditions
are no longer valid. To replicate the optimum the worker share in bargaining
must exceed the Hosios level, and one must impose a tax on job search
activity. The coalition in favor of ALMP is also studied.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the e¤ect of active labor market policies (ALMP) in a
Mortensen-Pissarides style matching model. ALMPs are modelled as a sub-
sidy to job search, and it is assumed that search activity is observed. A key
feature of the model is that workers di¤er in their productivity, and that
search takes place along an extensive margin. The model is used to study
the e¤ect of ALMP on the equilibrium, on aggregate welfare, and, equally
importantly, on the distribution of welfare across worker types (productivity
levels) and current labor market status (employed vs. unemployed).
It is shown that in addition to the usual job search externality, there is
a "quality" externality. As search is not directed, an additional job seeker
a¤ects the average quality of the pool of unemployed, in addition to the
job nding rate. As a result, the usual "Hosios" conditions for an e¢ cient
outcome  that the bargaining share of workers match their elasticity in
the matching function are no longer valid1. For an e¢ cient outcome, the
decentralized equilbrium conditions must match the optimal ones for both
the job creation margin of rms and the job search decision of workers, and
these two conditions cannot be matched with a single instrument. It is shown,
paradoxically, that to replicate the optimum one must select a worker share
in bargaining which is larger than their elasticity in the matching function,
and at the same time one must impose a tax on job search activity.
Clearly, this prediction does not validate the view that ALMPs are a
desirable policy tool. The reason is that they raise workersoutside option
in bargaining, thus contributing to wage pressure, while at the same time
reducing the average quality of job seekers. The optimal policy outlined
above delivers an improved quality of job seeker, due to the search tax, while
the bargaining share in excess of the Hosios level compensates for the implied
reduction in the workersoutside option.
Despite their negative e¤ects on aggregate welfare, we can characterize
1See Hosios (1990).
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a coalition in favor of ALMPs2. These are favored by the least productive
job seekers (or "short-term" unemployed") and the least productive workers.
The former gain directly from the subsidy, and the latter gain from an en-
hanced outside option in bargaining. On the other hand, more productive
workers and job seekers lose from it. They are harmed due to the fall in the
job nding rate, which reects in particular the deterioration in average job
seeker quality. Finally, the workers who do not search (or "long term unem-
ployed") only benet if they are su¢ ciently close to the extensive margin of
searching, that is, su¢ ciently productive. The least productive long-term un-
employed are too far from the extensive margin of job search to benet from
the policy, and su¤er from the nancial burden of the search subsidy. Con-
sequently, they oppose the policy. Note however that this analysis would be
changed if ALMP were explicitly targeted at the least productive unemployed
workers. Here, instead, by monitoring job search irrespective of productivity,
the policy is implicity targeted at those workers whose productivity level is
immediately below the critical search threshold.
This paper is related to the recent literature on labor market policy
analysis in the context of frictional models, following Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (2014). This literature has analyzed to some details the e¤ect of
unemployment benets, often in the context of calibrated numerical analy-
sis (see for example Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), Fredriksson and Holm-
lund (2001), Mortensen and Pissarides (2003), Lehmann and van der Linden
(2007), Krusell et al. (2010), Michau (2013)). The main novelty here is the
focus on ALMP and the role played by the extensive margin of job search,
which introduces a new externality (See Ortega (2000) for a related e¤ect
when search is not directed and workers are heterogeneous). Also, the de-
sign of the model allows us to provide analytical results instead of relying on
numerical simulations.
2The political economy of unemployed benets was analyzed in a pioneering paper
by Wright (1986). Active labor market policy was analyzed from a political economy
perspective by Saint-Paul (1998, 2000). Boeri et al. (2012) focus on the arbitrage between
unemployment benets and employment protection.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the basic frame-
work, which is a standard matching model with heterogeneous worker produc-
tivity and a xed search cost. Section 3 computes the equilibrium. Section 4
compares it with the utilitarian welfare optimum, and proves the rst main
result of the paper, i.e. that if the Hosios condition holds, the market out-
come is associated with a suboptimally low job seeker quality and too much
worker search, i.e. too small labor market tighter. Section 5 studies the
e¤ect on welfare of active labor market policies and shows that the rst best
equilibrium can be replicated if the worker bargaining share and the search
subsidy are set at their optimal levels, that are characterized by a bargaining
share higher than the Hosios level and a search tax. Also, I characterize the
e¤ect of ALMP on di¤erent categories of workers. There, the key result is
that there exist two threshold levels for worker productivity (denoted by y),
~ye and ~yu; such that ~yu > ~ye, such that the employed (resp. the unemployed
job seekers) oppose an increase in the search subsidy if and only if y > ~ye
(resp. ~yu > ~ye).
2 The basic framework
Workers di¤er by their productivity y; and the population distribution of y
is given by a density  (y) and c.d.f. 	(y): At any point in time, unemployed
workers may be searching or not searching in the latter case their utility is
equal to zero. We distinguish between ut; the total number of unemployed
workers, and ut; those who are actively searching. The matching rate per unit
of time is m(ut; vt) and the labor market tightness parameter  is dened as
 = v=u: As usual, m() has constant returns to scale and the vacancy lling
rate is denoted by q() = m(1=; 1); while the job nding rate is q():
In order to be searching workers must incur a unit cost equal to d per
unit of time. There is a constant job loss rate equal to s: The wage of a
worker of type y is denoted by w(y): The value functions for being employed
Ve, unemployed Vu, and the value of a job J depend on the workers type
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and their valuation equations are, assuming steady state,
rVu(y) =  d+ q()(Ve(y)  Vu(y));
rVe(y) = w(y) + s(Vu(y)  Ve(y));
rJ(y) = y   w(y)  sJ(y);
while wages are set by a standard Nash bargaining process with a fraction '
of the net surplus going to the worker. This implies the following equilibrium
relationship:
Ve(y) = Vu(y) +
'
1  'J(y):
Eliminating Ve; J; and w from these 4 equations, we can get Vu(y) for a
given  and we get
rVu(y) =
 d(r + s) + 'q()y
r + s+ 'q()
: (1)
It is then easy to compute the value of being employed for a worker of
type y :
rVe(y) =
 d(r(1  ') + s) + '(q() + r)y
r + s+ 'q()
: (2)
Finally the wage is
w(y) =
'(r + s+ q())y   (1  ')(r + s)d
r + s+ 'q()
:
We note that the search cost d brings wages down, by reducing the op-
portunity cost of work.
3 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium, we need to derive the job creation condition.
We denote by y the average productivity of job applicants. The value of a
worker with productivity y to the rm is
J(y) =
y   w(y)
r + s
=
(1  ')(y + d)
r + s+ 'q()
:
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Free entry of vacancies implies that EJ(y) = c=q(); where the expecta-
tions are taken with respect to the pool of job applicants. Since J is linear
in y; this is equivalent to J(y) = c=q(); or equivalently
y + d =
c(r + s)
(1  ')q() +
'
1  'c: (3)
This job creation locus denes an increasing relationship between y and
: The tighter the labor market, the greater the rmssearch costs and the
greater the average productivity of applicants must be to compensate.
Next, we need to know which workers search and which workers do not
search. A worker of type y searches, in steady state, if and only if Vu(y) > 0:
Using (1), we get that this is equivalent to
 d(r + s) + 'q()y > 0:
Therefore, there exists a critical productivity level y above which workers
search, and
y =
d(r + s)
'q()
: (4)
In steady state, the average productivity of both job applicants and em-
ployed workers is then equal to
y = E(y j y > y) =
R +1
y y (y)dy
1 	(y) :
Clearly, dy=dy > 0: Therefore, (3) alternatively denes a positive rela-
tionship between y and : By contrast, (4) denes a decreasing relationship
between  and y: When the labor market is tighter, so is the job nding
rate which induces more unemployed workers to search. Accordingly the
productivity threshold falls.
Equilibrium is then determined, as on Figure 1, by the intersection be-
tween the rmsjob creation condition JC, dened by (3), and the workers
search condition WS, dened by (4). This intersection denes the market
outcome values of  and y; denoted by M and yM respectively.
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Consider, for example, an increase in the workersbargaining power ': It
shifts both loci down (Figure 2). As a result,  unambiguously falls but y
may go up or down. Firms post fewer vacancies because they appropriate a
smaller fraction of the surplus of the match. Workers search more for any 
because they appropriate a greater fraction of the surplus. But as  falls, this
per se discourages worker search, so that the overall e¤ect on y is ambiguous.
We can also note that in steady state, the unemployment rate is given by
u1 = 	(y) + (1 	(y)) s
s+ q()
=
s+	(y)q()
s+ q()
:
Consequently, if the net e¤ect of an increase in ' on y is negative, it
may be that the unemployment rate is lower in the long run. Despite the fall
in job nding rates, expectations of appropriating a greater fraction of the
surplus brings some of the "long-term unemployed" back into job search.
4 Social welfare
It is interesting to compare the preceding equilibrium with the social opti-
mum. To be able to do this we need to formulate the social planners problem
adequately. There generally is an innite number of state variables, given by
the unemployment rate of type y at date t; u(t; y): Total output at t must
then be equal to
yt =
Z +1
0
y(1  u(t; y)) (y)dy:
At each date the social planner chooses the vacancy rate vt; or equivalently
the degree of labor market tightness t; as well as the minimum productivity
level yt for workers to search. Therefore, the evolution equations of u(t; y)
are given by
_u (t; y) = s(1  u(t; y)); y < yt ;
_u (t; y) = s(1  u(t; y))  tq(t)u(t; y); y > yt :
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The social planners objective function is given by
max
Z +1
0
[ (ct + d)ut + yt] e rtdt;
where ut; the stock of unemployed workers actively searching, is given by
ut =
Z +1
y
u(t; y) (y)dy:
That is, the social planner maximizes the present discounted value of
output net of rms(cv = cu) and workers(du) search costs.
The co-state variable associated with u(t; y) is denoted by [ (t; y)e rt (y)] :
The quantity (t; y) is interpreted as the marginal social value of an addi-
tional employed worker of type y: We can now write down the Hamiltonian:
H = [ (ct + d)ut + yt] e rt
 e rt
 R y
0
(t; y)s(1  u(t; y)) (y)dy
+
R +1
y (t; y) (s(1  u(t; y))  tq(t)u(t; y)) (y)dy
!
:
Next, we can write down the FOC:
@H
@t
= 0()  cut + (q(t) + tq0(t))
Z +1
y
(t; y)u(t; y) (y)dy = 0; (5)
@H
@yt
= 0, ct + d  (t; y)tq(t) = 0; (6)
@H
@u(t; y)
=

@
@t
(t; y)  r(t; y)

e rt (y)
,
  y + (r + s)(t; y) = @
@t
(t; y); y < y
 y   (ct + d) + (r + s+ tq(t))(t; y) = @@t(t; y); y > y

Let us now focus on the steady state. We note that the marginal value
of an employed worker of type y is, in steady state:
(t; y) =
y
r + s
for y < y
(t; y) =
y + c + d
r + s+ q()
for y > y: (7)
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Substituting into (6) allows to compute y; and we get
y =
(c + d) (r + s)
q()
: (8)
This condition denes the socially optimal search threshold for the work-
ers. We can check that  is continuous at y = y: Finally in steady state we
have u(t; y) = s=(s+q()) = u for all y > y: It follows that u = u(1 	(y))
and, substituting (7) into (5), we get
c(r + s  2q0()) = (E(y j y > y) + d)(q() + q0()): (9)
This condition denes the socially optimal job creation condition.
4.1 Comparing equilibrium and optimum.
To compare the equilibrium and the optimum, we need to confront (8)-(9)
with (4)-(3). Comparing the equilibrium and optimum job creation condi-
tion, i.e. (3) and (9), it is straightforward to check that the usual Hosios
condition ' =  q0()=q() must hold. However, this condition is no longer
su¢ cient. For the two worker search condition to match, we would need in
addition that
' =
d
c + d
;
which generally does not hold.
The term c in the denominator of the preceding formula captures the con-
gestion externality exerted by an unemployed worker who decides to search.
This decision would reduce  and to prevent it from falling, vacancies have
to rise by an amount ; implying that an extra vacancy cost c must be
spent. This extra cost is taken into account by the central planner but not
by the individual worker. If the workers appropriability level is equal to the
ratio between his private search cost d and the social one c + d; then the
congestion externality is internalized.
So far there is nothing new in this line of reasoning and it does not
highlight why here (contrary to the usual case) the Hosios conditions fail
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to internalize the congestion externalities. The reason is that this negative
externality is exerted upon an unemployed worker of average productivity,
whereas the marginal unemployed worker only takes into account his own
productivity level when considering the gains from search.
Consequently, even at the Hosios conditions, the degree to which the
marginal worker internalizes the congestion problem is inadequate, because
his productivity di¤ers from the productivity of the workers upon which the
externality is exerted (a "quality e¤ect"). Since the marginal worker is less
productive than the average, this e¤ect tends to lead to too much worker
search. Therefore we expect the critical productivity level to be lower in
the market equilibrium than in the centrally planned solution if the Hosios
conditions hold  since the usual congestion externalities are internalized at
the Hosios conditions, only the quality e¤ect dominates.
The following Proposition formally shows that, if the Hosios conditions
hold, both labor market tightness and the critical productivity level (and
hence the average productivity of the employed) are too low in the decen-
tralized equilibrium compared to the social optimum.
Proposition 1 Assume q() =   and ' = : Then
yM < y

SP ;
M < 

SP :
Proof Assume q() =   and ' = : Clearly, then, in the (; y) plane
the decentralized worker search schedule WS dened by (4) and the socially
optimal worker search schedule SSP dened by (8) intersect only once at
 = ~ =
d(1  )
c
: (10)
Furthermore, computing the derivative of the RHS of (8) shows that this
is the minimum point of SSP. It is straightforward to compute the value of
y at this intersection point. It is given by
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~y = (r + s)
c1 d
(1  )1  : (11)
Next, we can show that the decentralized JC condition (3) coincides with
the social one (8). Their common expression is
y + d =
c(r + s)
1   
 +

1  c:
Substituting (10) into that equation, and comparing with (11) we see that
at  = ~ y = ~y along the job destruction locus. Since y > y; it must be that
the common JD locus is below the intersection point between SSP and WS
at  = ~: Since JD is upward sloing in the (; y) plane, SSP is U-shaped with
a minimum at  = ~; and WS downward sloping, JD intersects intersects WS
before SSP. This proves the claims of the proposition.
QED
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 1. If ' =  the Hosios conditions hold and
the JC loci (9) and (3) coincide. The social planners optimal worker search
condition is given by SSP (dened by (8)) and the corresponding market
condition is WS (expressed by (4)). These two conditions intersect at a
point ~; which furthermore is the minimum point of SSP. The JC condition
is below the intersection point, so that it cuts WS before SSP, on the right
of this minimum point.
The LHS of (8) and (4) is the marginal benet  expressed in terms
of the additional ow of output generated by that worker when eventually
employed of putting an additional unemployed worker into active search.
The corresponding RHSs are the social and private marginal costs of doing
so, respectively. The social planner considers the congestion cost imposed
on the average job seeker, while at the Hosios conditions the marginal job
seeker only internalizes the congestion costs imposed on marginal workers.
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5 Welfare e¤ects of active labor market poli-
cies
Now we assume that the government pursues an active labor market policy,
understood as a subsidy to job search which reduces the cost of search from
d to d    : I assume that somehow the government can enforce this policy,
i.e. the subsidy  is not paid to the workers who do not search. That is, the
unemployeds search activity is "monitored" and  is paid only upon proof of
search activity. This makes the policy resemble more an active labor market
policy than an unemployment benet system.
Furthermore, all unemployed job seekers are entitled to the subsidy, ir-
respective of their productivity or employment history. The analysis could
deliver di¤erent results if, say, the subsidies were targeted to the low produc-
tivity workers3.
I assume the subsidy is nanced by a lump-sum tax levied on all workers.
This tax does not introduce distortions in equilibrium determination, so the
above computations for the equilibrium endogenous variables remain correct.
However the present discounted value of the tax now has to be deducted from
the welfare of the employed and the unemployed, as dened in equations (3)
and (2).
To compute this tax burden, we note that for a given search threshold y
and a given distribution of unemployment rates by productivity levels u0(y);
the initial stock of unemployed workers actually searching is given by
u0 =
Z +1
y
u0(y) (y)dy:
The total number of employed workers of types y > y at date t is given
3In particular, in Saint-Paul (1998), active labor market policies harm the insiders,
because they raise the search e¤ort of outsiders. But here the insiders would benet from
the policy should they lose their job, which raises their bargaining power. Therefore, active
policies may have very di¤erent e¤ects on the welfare of incumbent workers depending on
how they are designed.
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by 1 	(y)  ut: Consequently, the law of motion of ut is
d
dt
ut = s (1 	(y)  ut)  q()ut:
The solution is
ut = (u0   u1) e (s+q())t + u1;
where
u1 =
s (1 	(y))
s+ q()
:
The tax cost of the subsidy at date t is
Tt =  ut;
therefore the PDV of this tax isZ +1
0
Tte
 rtdt = H;
where
H =
u0
r + s+ q()
+
u1(s+ q())
r(r + s+ q())
=
u0
r + s+ q()
+
s(1 	(y))
r(r + s+ q())
:
The utility function of an unemployed worker who is searching and has a
productivity y can then be rewritten as
Vu(y) =
(   d)(r + s) + 'q()y
r(r + s+ 'q())
  H: (12)
Similarly for the employed:
Ve(y) =
(   d)(r(1  ') + s) + '(q() + r)y
r(r + s+ 'q())
  H: (13)
We also need to discuss how  a¤ects the job destruction and worker
search conditions. For this it is enough to replace d by d   in those condi-
tions, and we get
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y + d   = c(r + s)
(1  ')q() +
'
1  'c; (14)
y =
(d  )(r + s)
'q()
: (15)
We see that in the (; y) plane an increase in  shifts WS down and JC
to the left. Labor market tightness unambiguously falls while the change in
the average quality of workers is ambiguous.
The subsidy to job search raises the opportunity cost of work for those
worker types who actively search. This increases wage pressure thus reducing
protability and the incentives to post vacancies. Therefore  falls. Further-
more at the extensive margin, given ; more workers want to search. As
such this e¤ect tends to further reduce  because the additional workers are
less productive than average, thus reducing again the value of posting vacan-
cies. However the fall in  per se tends to discourage job search, and if this
fall is strong enough worker quality actually goes up, and so does long-term
unemployment, despite the subsidy to job search.
The e¤ects of  are qualitatively similar to those of ' : Both parameters
shift the two loci in the same direction. A greater ' increases the workers
power in wage setting through the rent they can extract from the employer,
while  does it through their outside option in bargaining. A greater '
reduces y given  because the prospects of greater rents induce more workers
to search, while a greater  does so through direct subsidization of search.
We are now in a position to discuss the e¤ects of ALMP on welfare.
We rst start with social welfare and then proceed to discuss the welfare of
di¤erent categories of workers.
5.1 Social welfare
While we already know that the Hosios conditions per se are insu¢ cient
to restore e¢ ciency, we can analyze which combination of ' and  delivers
the rst best. Admittedly this is a contrived exercise since  presumably is
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a policy variable while ' is not. But ' can be targeted indirectly by the
policymaker through regulations such as severance payments4.
We need to match the optimality condition with the equilibrium ones.
The equilibrium job creation condition (14) must coincide with the optimality
condition (9) for y = ySP and  = SP : Let  =  SP q0(SP )=q(SP ): Then
eliminating y = E(y j y > ySP ) between these two conditions and dropping
the "SP" subscript we get the following:
 =
c(r + s+ q())
q()(1  )  
c(r + s+ 'q())
q()(1  ') : (16)
This denes a decreasing, concave relationship, called OJC, in the ('; )
plane which goes through the point (; 0): This relationship depicts the com-
binations of ' and  that make rms internalize the congestion externality
in job search. These are the combinations that deliver the correct social
opportunity cost of labor. If for example the fraction of the surplus appro-
priated by the worker is greater than the Hosios level, then the cost of labor
is too high and one has to tax search to reduce the workers outside option
in bargaining, thus bringing the cost of labor down back to the correct level
from the social planners perspective.
Similarly, we can match the equilibrium worker search condition (15) with
the optimality one (8) and we get
 =  'c + (1  ')d: (17)
This denes another decreasing, linear relationship between  and ':
These are the combinations of ' and  that deliver the socially optimal
benet of search to the unemployed workers, reecting both the quality and
congestion externalities. Since we know that the latter is internalized by
4See for example the analysis in Saint-Paul, 2014. Of course, how allocative severance
payments are depends on the degree of commitments of rms and workers in bargaining.
Under full commitment, a severance payment will be o¤set by a transfer upon recruitment,
and will have no e¤ect on equilibrium job creation. However, under imperfect commitment,
the severance payment will raise the workers threat point in bargaining whenever wages
are being renegotiated.
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workers at ' = ; only the (negative) quality externality remains, implying
that along this locus  < 0 at ' =  : search must be taxed for workers
to internalize the negative e¤ect of the marginal job seeker on the average
quality of the pool5.
The joint determination of the optimal ' and  is depicted on Figure
4. The OJC locus depicts the relationship (16), while OWS represents (17).
The optimal solution can then be characterized relative to the benchmark
Hosios condition without ALMP as follows:
Proposition 2 The optimal values of ' and  are such that ' >  and
 < 0:
PROOF Clearly, from the RHS of (16), we have that lim'!1  =  1
along OJC. We already know that the RHS of (16) is greater than that of
(17) at ' = : Since the RHS of (17) remains nite at ' = 1; by continuity
there exists a value of ' 2 (; 1) ; '; at which OJC and OWS cross. Clearly,
the corresponding   is negative. Furthermore, the RHS of (16) is a concave
function of '; while that of (17) is a¢ ne: Therefore, there is at most one
other intersection point between OJC and OWS, and it must be such that
' < : For ' = 0; the RHS of (17) is equal to d: The RHS of (16) is equal to
c(r + s+ q())
q()(1  )  
c(r + s)
q()
=
c
1  

r + s
q()
+ 

:
5Indeed this can be checked algebraically, by noting that
cSP + d
SP q(SP )
(r + s) <
c(r + s+ SP q(SP ))
q(SP )(1  )   d:
and then showing that this inequality is equivalent to
0 <

1   c   d:
Finally, it is immediate that at ' =  the RHS of (17) is negative.
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Now, from (9), and using (8), we have that
c
1  

r + s
q()
+ 

= d+ y
> d+ y
= d+ (r + s)
c
q()
+ d
r + s
q()
;
from which it follows that c
1 

r+s
q()
+ 

> d: Therefore OJC is above OWS
at ' = 0; and, by concavity, also over [0; '): Therefore, the only intersection
between OJC and OWS is (';  ):
QED
The optimal policy is to raise the workers rent beyond the Hosios level
while at the same time implementing a negative active labor market policy
which taxes job search (we ignore feasibility constraints on such policies).
This is just the opposite of what, say, an OECD report would recommend.
One way to interpret this result is as follows: starting from the Hosios
condition value of '; search must be taxed because of the quality externality.
But taxing search reduces the cost of labor, leading to too high a vacancy
level. To compensate for that, one must further raise the workers bargaining
power, which in turn must lead to a higher tax on job search6.
5.2 E¤ect on the welfare of di¤erent types of workers
I now study which groups gain and lose from ALMPs. In the sequel I will
assume that an increase in  has a "normal" e¤ect on y; i.e. that y falls7.
As a result it must be that dH=d > 0; both because y falls (a greater
6Note however that this process converges to a consistent pair ('; ) only because (i)
OJC becomes steeper relative to OWS as one moves to the right, and (ii) the opposite
strategy of reducing ' and compensating by a raise in  does not converge because OWS
and OJC fail to cross on the left of ' = : This suggests that for some di¤erent version
of the model one could have an optimum with  > 0 and ' <  instead. Intuitively, what
is much more robust is the prediction that the optimal policy must satisfy ('   ) < 0:
Hence, if active labor market policy proves to be optimal, it must be accompanied with a
reduction in the workers bargaining power relative to the Hosios level.
7Otherwise introducing a subsidy to job search would hardly qualify as "active" labor
market policy.
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proportion of the population is eligible for the subsidy) and  falls (people
who do search remain unemployed longer, so the subsidy has to be paid to
them for a longer period).
Equations (12) and (13) imply that we can distinguish three kind of e¤ects
of the subsidy on di¤erent categories of workers:
 The negative direct tax e¤ects are given by d
d
(H) and are the same
for all workers, including those who do not search. These ones have a
utility equal to  H and they clearly are worse-o¤, unless the change
in the subsidy makes them switch from non-search to search.
 The direct positive e¤ect of the subsidy on the utility ow while search-
ing. This e¤ect is given by
r + s
r(r + s+ 'q())
for the unemployed and by
r(1  ') + s
r(r + s+ 'q())
for the employed. It is therefore stronger for the unemployed than for
the employed, as their discounted expected time spent in unemploy-
ment is obviously larger. Furthermore this e¤ect does not depend on
the workers productivity y:
 The indirect negative e¤ect on utility through the fall in : It is equal
to
d
d
(q() + q0())
'(r + s)(y + d  )
r(r + s+ 'q())2
for the unemployed and to
d
d
(q() + q0())
'(r(1  ') + s)(y + d  )
r(r + s+ 'q())2
for the employed. We notice that this negative e¤ect is also stronger for
the unemployed, for whom the job nding rate matters more than for the em-
ployed. Also, this e¤ect is stronger for more productive workers, because they
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appropriate part of the surplus of the match and therefore get higher wages,
which makes them lose more from any reduction in job nding rates. This
suggests that, controlling for labor market status, more productive workers
are more likely to oppose active labor market policies.
The preceding formulas allow us to nd out who gains and who loses from
an increase in  among the employed and the unemployed. Consolidating all
the terms spelled out above, we see that the marginal gains can be written
as (r+ s)(y)  d
d
(H) for the unemployed and (r(1 ')+ s)(y)  d
d
(H)
for the employed, where
(y) =
1
r(r + s+ 'q())
+
d
d
(q() + q0())
'(y + d  )
r(r + s+ 'q())2
;
and 0 < 0: Therefore we see that an employed worker opposes the increase
in  i¤ his productivity level is greater than
~ye = 
 1(
1
r(1  ') + s
d
d
(H)):
In particular, if ~ye < y; all the employed opposed ALMPs.
As for the unemployed, their corresponding critical productivity level is
~yu = 
 1(
1
r + s
d
d
(H)) > ~ye:
This inequality means that unemployed searchers are more in favor of
active labor market policies than the employed.
However, the long-term unemployed, i.e. those such that y < y; op-
pose it, except a tiny band of workers who are just below the critical search
threshold and who switch their behavior because of the subsidy (but this
band would not be tiny if we were considering a non innitesimal increment
in ). Thus, somewhat paradoxically, here most of the long-term unemployed
oppose ALMPs, however this is because here worker search only operates
through the extensive margin. More generally, though, it makes sense to
think that, to the extent that they have to contribute to their costs as tax-
payers, the most disenfranchised long-term unemployed do not particularly
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support active labor market policies as it is unlikely to raise their own job
nding rate.
This discussion allows us to characterize the constituency in favor of ac-
tive labor market policy. If y < ~ye; then the coalition of workers in favor of
ALMPs is made of the least productive employed workers, the least produc-
tive short-term unemployed, and the most productive long-term unemployed.
The opponents are the least productive long-term unemployed, and the most
productive employed and job-seekers. As the short-term unemployed are
more in favor of ALMPs than the employed, the opponents among the for-
mer are more productive than the opponents among the latter.
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